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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of this appeal properly lies in the Utah 
Court of Appeals under Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(h)(Supp. 
1986) . 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This is a civil, non-domestic lawsuit arising out of 
the termination of Gilmore's employment with the Salt Lake 
Area Community Action Program. It was instituted in the 
Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County. The 
Honorable Judge Homer Wilkinson presided. On June 26, 
1987, the Court granted the Respondents1 Motion for 
Summary Judgment and entered its Order dismissing 
Gilmore's Complaint in its entirety. 
Gilmore is appealing this Summary Judgment only as it 
pertains to his first and second causes of action which 
are for breach of an employment contract. Brief of 
Appellant/Plaintiff, p. 4. The appeal was originally 
taken to the Utah Supreme Court. It was then poured over 
to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether Gilmorefs employment was at will, 
2. Whether the Personnel Policies Manual conferred 
any contractual rights upon Gilmore. 
3. Whether Respondents breached the employment 
contract. 
4. Whether the Respondents, other than the Salt Lake 
Area Community Action Program, are personally liable for 
breach of the employment contract. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is a civil, non-domestic dispute arising 
out of the termination of Gilmore1s employment with the 
Salt Lake Community Action Program. It was first 
instituted on April 25, 1979, in the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah, Central Division. 
Walter K. Gilmore v. Salt Lake Area Community Action 
Program, et al., #C-79-0258. On December 30, 1980, that 
Court granted Defendants1 motion for summary judgment, 
dismissing that action on its merits with prejudice, on 
the grounds that there was no federal jurisdiction. 
Gilmore appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit. In the decision, Gilmore v. SaJt Lake 
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Area Community Action Program, 710 F.2d 632 (1983), the 
Tenth Circuit affirmed the District Court judgment and 
entered the judgment on April 18, 1983. He petitioned for 
a rehearing which was denied on July 27, 1983. Id. 
On July 23, 1984, Gilmore instituted this lawsuit in 
the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County. 
Record at 2 (hereafter abbreviated "R."). The Court 
ordered, pursuant to the parties' stipulation, that the 
depositions and other discovery taken in the previous 
Federal Court action be filed and published in this 
action. Once published, Gilmore and Respondents filed 
cross motions for summary judgment. R. at 52 & 101. 
At the hearing on the summary judgment motions the 
parties stipulated that Gilmore's sixth, seventh, eighth 
and ninth causes of action would be dismissed with 
prejudice. R. at 547-549. The Court then granted 
Respondents' motion as to all of the remaining causes of 
action, thereby dismissing Gilmore's Complaint in its 
entirety, with prejudice. R. at 545 & 547-549. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
A. Background. 
The Salt Lake Area Community Action Program, 
(hereafter referred to as S.L.C.A.P.) is a private, 
non-profit corporation organized under the laws of the 
State of Utah. R. at 2 & 24. It is not a Federal or 
State program or entity. Gilmore v. Salt Lake Area 
Community Action Program, 710 F.2d 632. It was organized 
"to establish, operate and coordinate community action 
programs in order to prevent and alleviate poverty and its 
causes, and to cooperate with other organizations, and to 
secure and expend monies for these purposes." R. at 150. 
For instance, S.L.C.A.P. performs numerous neighborhood 
programs including the administration in whole or in part 
for the Community Food and Nutrition Program, Head Start, 
Day Care, Handicap Head Start, Weatherization, Energy 
Crisis Assistance Program and others. Parara Deposition 
at 72-83. 
S.L.C.A.P. funds these programs by qualifying for 
various grants and contracts. Schultz Deposition at 
12-13. One major grant comes from a federal agency, the 
Community Services Administration. Vanderburgh Deposition 
at 10-15. S.L.C.A.P. qualifies for this grant by 
conforming to Community Services Administration 
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Instructions. Id. at 29; 45 C.F.R. 1060-1070 (repealed 
1981). In so doing, S.L.C.A.P. adopted a personnel 
policies manual in 1972 to conform with these 
instructions. Schultz Deposition at 9 & Ex. P-l. This 
manual was in effect at all times material to this action. 
R. at 5 & 54. 
S.L.C.A.P. is controlled by a Board of Trustees. R. 
at 153; Philbrick Deposition at 12. The Board is 
composed of local officials, representatives of the poor, 
business, and labor. R. at 152. The Board's President is 
the Defendant Robert E. Philbrick. R. at 3; Philbrick 
Deposition at 5. He succeeded the Defendant Ann O'Connell 
who was president at the time the employee, Walter 
Gilmore, was discharged from employment. R. at 3. 
The Board of Trustees delegates its authority for the 
day-to-day operations of S.L.C.A.P. to the Executive 
Director, Defendant Hal J. Schultz. R. at 151. He has 
authority for all personnel decisions, including the 
authority to reduce in force employees as he deems fit. 
R. at 153; Philbrick Deposition at 15. His decisions 
are, however, subject to review by the Personnel 
Committee. R. at 156; Schultz Deposition at 9 & Ex. P-]. 
The Personnel Committee is comprised of three members 
elected by the Board of Trustees. R. at 150 & 156. Its 
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membership is limited to three of the Board of Trustees1 
Members. Id. 
B. Facts Relating to Gilmore's Contract of 
Employment. 
Gilmore first interviewed for a temporary accounting 
position with S.L.C.A.P. on March 5, 1974. Gilmore 
Deposition at 5 & 7-8. In that interview salary was 
discussed and he was told that the job "was a temporary 
position,that it would last probably three months." Id. 
at 7-9; R. at 53. Gilmore does not remember that any 
documents were provided him. Gilmore Deposition at 9. He 
does not recall anything else about the interview "except 
that it was just the - - I'm sure it was a rather typical 
question and answer type of interview. He asked me about 
my experience and qualifications and I'm sure the usual 
type of inquiries." .Id. at 8. He was hired for the 
position the following day, March 6, 1974. R. at 3 6c 53. 
Gilmore worked in this temporary position for six 
months. R. at 3. During this time he did not have any 
conversations with anyone of a supervisory nature 
concerning the terms of his employment, "Not beyond what I 
had already understood, as I remember." Gilmore 
Deposition at 9. 
On about September 6, 1974, the position of Fiscal 
Director became available. Id. at 10. The Executive 
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Director, Hal J. Schultz, was the immediate supervisor 
over this position and responsible for staffing it. R. at 
2 & 151. Gilmore asked the Executive Director to consider 
him for the position. Gilmore Deposition at 10. The 
Executive Director checked Gilmore1s qualifications and on 
September 9, 1974, he was promoted to the position. Id. 
at 11-12, R. at 3 & 53. Gilmore does not remember any 
other terms or conditions of his employment discussed at 
that time other than that he was subject to a six month 
probationary period. Gilmore Deposition at 12-13. He 
also does not remember any documents provided him in 
reference to the terms and conditions of his employment. 
16. at 13. 
Sometime soon after September 9, 1974, Gilmore was 
supplied with a copy of the Personnel Policies Manual. 
Gilmore Deposition at 18. He obtained a copy for his desk 
and kept it there. I_d. He does not recall how he 
obtained it, who gave it to him or having any 
conversations with anyone about it at that time. _Id. at 
18 & 19. 
One conversation took place with the Executive 
Director in terms of Gilmore's responsibilities as fiscal 
director towards the company and the staff. id. at 19-21. 
But Gilmore does not know how, when or where the 
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conversation took place. He recalls being told, "that the 
regulations in it would apply. Those, so far as they 
would apply, I would be expected to follow them in my 
position as employee as well as supervisor." Id. at 17 & 
20. He does not remember any other conversations with 
anyone else at S.L.C.A.P. relative to his employment 
through March, 1975. Id. at 22. 
The Executive Director maintained a policy of 
advising persons who were hired that the Manual existed. 
But he did not personally advise each employee. Schultz 
Deposition at 16. Gilmore admits, however, that his 
employment with S.L.C.A.P. contained no specified definite 
period of time for employment. R. at 117, 575 & 581. 
C. Facts Relative to Gilmore's Termination. 
Sometime during 1976 federal officials indicated that 
Gilmore was having difficulty in the record keeping and 
reporting. Gilmore Deposition at 87 - 88. They also 
reported that S.L.C.A.P.fs accounting systems and 
procedures were cumbersome and outdated. Schultz 
This fact is an admission made by Gilmore in 
response to Respondents1 Request For Admissions. R. at 
575 & 581. This admission is reproduced verbatim in the 
addendum herein, p. 5 & 1J. 
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Deposition at 99 - 100. An audit was performed for the 
fiscal year ending March 31, 1976. Gilmore's accounting 
reflected a deficit for that period of $1,800.00. The 
audit established that the deficit was $9,800.00. Id. at 
151; Gilmore Deposition at 81-82. The auditors declared 
that fiscal period inauditable as well as the entire 
period Gilmore was Fiscal Director. Gilmore Deposition 
at 84-85. 
The decision was made in May or June, 1976 to 
computerize the Fiscal Department. Ld. at 86 & 89; 
Schultz Deposition at 99-100. However, Gilmore held no 
computer skills. Gilmore Deposition at 28. S.L.C.A.P. 
retained the firm, Bunker and Bunker, Certified Public 
Accountants, to assist Gilmore in this process. Icl. at 
89; Schultz Deposition at 100 & 126. The computerization 
process was to proceed without delay. The general ledger 
was top priority, followed by the payroll. Ld. at 
101-102; Gilmore Deposition at 89. But Gilmore's accounts 
had to be reconstructed. It took six months to place the 
payroll into the computer. Gilmore Deposition at 89-90. 
During the fall of 1976, the federal officials 
continued to complain about how Gilmore's department was 
handling S.L.C.A.P. !s affairs. Icl- at 94-96. Both the 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare and the 
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Community Services Administration indicated their desire 
for accurate accounting. Id. 
It was during this time, on September 27, 1976, that 
the Executive Director began a written evaluation on 
Gilmore's job performance. Schultz Deposition at 23 & 
Exhibit P-2. This was the only written evaluation he 
attempted to make on Gilmore. R. at 11. He did not 
complete or sign it. Schultz Deposition at 23 & Exhibit 
P-2. In October, 1976, he discovered vast discrepancies 
in Gilmore's work. ld_. at 124 & 125. While the audit for 
the year ending March 31, 1976, established a $9,800.00 
deficit, in October, the Executive Director discovered an 
additional $16,000.00 variance in the reports prepared for 
him and the reports prepared for the Community Services 
Administration 16. at 124. The actual deficit was finally 
established at $46,362.00. Ld. at 90 & Ex. D-.L2. 
The Executive Director showed "understandable concern 
for the problems that the accounting department was 
having." Gilmore Deposition at 99. As a result he held 
several meetings with Gilmore prior to his discharge. 
Within the two years prior to discharge the Executive 
Director met with him on four or five occasions about 
specific problems with his department and the need to 
computerize it. Ld. at 90, 101-102 & Ex. D-12. Finally, 
the Executive Director met with Gilmore in October and 
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November or December, 1976, and indicated that Gilmorefs 
job was in jeopardy if the deficencies were not corrected. 
Ld. at 95-96. 
On December 15, 1976, the Executive Director reported 
specifically to the Board of Trustees a plan to reduce the 
large deficit. Ld* a t 90 & Ex. D-12. Gilmore was present 
during the discussion of this plan. Icl. The Executive 
Director proposed a reduction in the fiscal staff, and to 
obtain contract accounting. _Id. The idea was to contract 
the accounting out to a professional firm and have 
Gilmore remain as Office Manager. Schultz Deposition at 
128. However, the Board turned the plan down. Id. 
The Executive Director had no choice but to establish 
a different plan. Id. at 129. About February, 1977, in a 
meeting between the Executive Director, Gilmore and Mr. 
Johnson, the Executive Director examined Gilmore on his 
ability to submit properly a report to the Regional 
Office, and indicated, again, that his job was in jeopardy 
due to the deficiencies in the performance of his 
responsibilities. Id. at J00-101 & 111. 
Finally, in March, 1977, the Executive Director 
completely reorganized the Fiscal Department. Schultz 
Deposition at 129. The substantive reorganization was: 
I hired an accounting supervisor with specified 
computer accounting background and reduced the force, 
terminating Mr. Gilmore, and 1 took over all the 
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policy type functions of the fiscal director and 
ordered the computer specialist to get our accounts 
straightened out and into a computer. _IcL at 
129-130. 
The Executive Director eliminated the position of Fiscal 
Director and assumed the fiscal policy making duties 
himself. Id. at 130. Gilmore was reduced in force rather 
than being fired. _Id. at 131. This was because the 
Executive Director believed that Gilmore needed 
unemployment compensation and needed to find other 
employment. Id. He notified Gilmore of his termination 
in a meeting the first part of March, 1977. Gilmore 
Deposition at 104. This meeting lasted the better part of 
an hour. I_d. at Vol. II p. 16. 
One to three days later, Gilmore called the Executive 
Director at his home and "told him that I would like a 
chance to meet with him and discuss the situation to see 
if possibly I could prevail upon him to change his mind." 
Id. at 108. The Executive Director agreed to hear him. 
Id. Gilmore describes the meeting as follows: 
It was a series of refutations, refuting of my 
efforts to defend myself as to my performance during 
the time I had been employed and efforts to suggest 
some kind of alleviating measures that could be taken 
without it, meaning my termination. ... The substance 
of what I said was to dissuade Mr. Schultz from his 
decision and to persuade him if possible, that there 
would be a better way to solve the problem for the 
agency and certainly for me than to fire me. I do 
not remember the words I used to bring that about, 
but that was about the extent of what I said. ... Id. 
at 109-110. 
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He describes what the Executive Director said as follows: 
The substance of what he said was that it was too 
late; there was no way now that I could save myself 
or salvage my job, that he was committed, he'd made 
statements to people, he was committed that my 
termination was to be made. And then he began to 
recite a number of instances, one of which 1 have 
mentioned about the false report. ... And Mr. SchuJtz 
questioned me on my ability to submit properly a 
form, a report to the regional office ... that I was 
huffy in the meeting that we had and the conversation 
that we had between him and myself and Mr. Johnson. 
Another thing that was brought up was a little 
argument I had with an employee, a man named Del 
Barker. ... Mr. Schultz's issue was that 1 had caused 
a disturbance and was argumentative with Mr. Barker 
over his paycheck ... Yes, a number of others, and I 
don't recall them right now. ... And, my 
responsibility for Jerry Murray, that this would be 
another very serious transgression on my part. Id. 
at 111-115. 
In both of these meetings Gilmore was not prevented from 
demonstrating why he should not be terminated. He was not 
limited in terms of being able to bring up those instances 
he felt justified his retention. Ld. at Vol. II p. 6 & 17. 
On March 14, 1977, Gilmore was notified in writing of 
his reduction in force. R. at 4 & 82. He was also 
provided a Utah Department of Employment Security 
Separation Notice citing the reason for termination as 
"reduction in force". R. at 4, 54 & 84. The March 14, 
1977, notification provided two weeks pay in J Leu of 
notice. Gilmore Deposition at Vol. II p. 9, 18, Ex. D-15 
& D-17. 
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On March 15, 1971, Gilmore wrote the Executive 
Director appealing his discharge. R. at 6, 55 & 83. On 
March 16, 1971, the Executive Director wrote Gilmore 
stating that he considered the second meeting in March to 
constitute his appeal to the Executive Director and that 
Gilmore had a right to appeal to the Personnel Committee. 
R. at 6 & 55. 
Gilmore then appealed to the Personnel Committee. A 
hearing was scheduled on March 16, 1977. R. at 7. Two 
members of the Committee were present. The format of the 
hearing was described in advance to Gilmore that he "would 
make a statement, that it would be taped on a tape 
recorder, and that when my statement was finished, that I 
wouJd be excused and Mr. Schultz would be called in to 
make a statement on the tape recorder." R. at 7 & 55-56; 
Gilmore Deposition at Vol. II p. 29-31. It was also 
determined at the beginning of the meeting that there 
would not be time to complete it until the following week. 
Id. Gilmore had no objection to this format, ^d. at 31. 
He then began making his statement into the recorder. The 
Executive Director was not present. R. at 7 & 56. 
The hearing was continued to March 21, 1977. Id. 
The Committee's three members were present while Gilmore 
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finished making his statement into the recorder* R. at 7 
& 56. He was then excused and the Executive Director was 
invited in to make his statement. Gilmore was not present 
during the Executive Director's presentation. R. at 7 & 
56. The Committee decided to have them give statements 
out of each other's presence because it believed it would 
be more fair not to have Gilmore's immediate supervisor 
present, "so Mr. Gilmore would feel free to speak his 
mind." Geter Deposition at 29. 
Gilmore admits that there was no evidence refused by 
the Committee that was offered by him. Gilmore Deposition 
at Vol. II p. 33. The Committee never
 r at any time, 
refused to allow him to do something he requested to do. 
Id. at 158. He admits he never requested that the 
Executive Director be present. 16. at Vol. II, p. 29. 
Nor did he request to confront or cross-examine him at any 
time. _Id. Gilmore further admits he never requested the 
right to challenge or disqualify any member of the 
2 
Personnel Committee. R. at 575 & 581. He never 
requested that the decision of the Personnel Committee be 
3 
based solely upon evidence adduced at the hearing. Id. 
Td. 
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He never requested a written decision of the Personnel 
4 Committee stating reasons for its decision. ld_. He 
5 
never requested that any verbatim record be made. Id. 
He never requested counsel. Gilmore Deposition at 158. 
All of the witnesses testified that Gilmore was 
afforded the same rights as was the Salt Lake Area 
Community Action Program. Geter Deposition at 13. The 
Personnel Committee Chairman testified that the Personnel 
Committee was not biased and was fair. 1^ 3. The decision 
of the Committee was based upon the evidence presented. 
Id. at 27. Both Gilmore and the Executive Director wrote 
statements in support of their position. Ij3. at 42-44 & 
48. 
On about April 1, 1977, the Personnel Committee 
Chairman told Gilmore that he had not been able to arrange 
for the members to meet to reach a final decision. R. at 
8. Gilmore was also notified that the Committee was not 
able to reach its decision in five days after the 
conclusion of the hearing due to the many pieces of 
evidence and legal ramifications. Gilmore Deposition at 
166. He did not object to this or make any statements to 
any member of the Committee or anyone else that they 
couldn't do that because it would take longer than five 
days. ]j3. at 166-167. 
i Id. 
Id. 
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On April 13, 1977, the Chairman of the Personnel 
Committee, Fred Geter, wrote to Gilmore and informed him 
that it " . . . upholds the decision of Hal Schultz in 
your reduction of force and reorganization of the Fiscal 
Department." Gilmore Deposition at 5-6 & Ex. D-14. The 
decision of the Personnel Committee was final. Ld. at 52. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF THE BREACH 
OF CONTRACT CLAIMS SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE 
GILMOREfS EMPLOYMENT WAS AT WILL. 
Gilmore admits that his employment with S.L.C.A.P. 
was for an indefinite period of time. He has not set 
forth any facts or presented any argument that his 
employment falls within an exception to the employment 
at-will doctrine. As a result, under the cases Bruno v. 
Plateau Mining Co., 73 Utah Adv. Rep. 89 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987), Rose v. Allied Development Co., 719 P.2d 83 (Utah 
1986) and Bihlmaier v. Carsen, 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979), 
Gilmore was an at-will employee who could be terminated 
for just cause or no cause, without recourse against his 
employer for breach of the employment contract. 
S.L.C.A.P.!s promulgation of a policy manual does not 
constitute an implied contract of employment. The manual 
does not contain any terms concerning the duration of 
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Gilmore's employment. In Bruno, 73 Utah Adv. Rep. 89, 
this Court flatly rejected other jurisdictions1 departures 
from the employment at-will doctrine in order to imply an 
employment contract from an employer's policies. 
POINT II. THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 
BECAUSE S.L.C.A.P. COMPLIED WITH THE 
PERSONNEL POLICIES. 
Even if S.L.C.A.P.'s policies limited the right to 
terminate Gilmore at will the law does not require strict 
or literal compliance with its terms. If S.L.C.A.P. 
substantially complied with the terms of the contract so 
as not to compromise the interests such terms were 
designed to safeguard, then it is not guilty of breach of 
the contract. Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, 
636 P.2d 1063 (Utah 1981). 
In this case, S.L.C.A.P. substantially complied with 
the policies, and each of the interests the policies were 
designed to safeguard were satisfied or protected. A 
close examination of the facts shows that in some 
instances S.L.C.A.P.fs slight deviations from the 
procedures actually promoted or enhanced the interests 
concerned. Therefor, even if S.L.C.A.P.'s policies 
limited the right to terminate Gilmore at-will, S.L.C.A.P. 
is not guilty of a breach thereof. 
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CLAIMS AGAINST THE EMPLOY. • - OFFICERS OF 
S.L.C.A.P. IS PROPER BECAUSE THESE INDIVIDUALS 
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BREACH OF CONTRACT, 
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ARGUMENT 
I'UIIJT I .inr: TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL C; THE BR! ,'• : 
OF CONTRACT CLAIMS SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 
BECAUSE THE EMPLOYMENT WAS AT WI I.I . 
A. The Dismissal. Of The Breach Of Contract Claims 
Was Proper Because The Employment Relationship Was 
Terminable At Will, 
G i1more asks th i s Cour t to reverse the t r Ia1 court f s 
s u i t i n g ^ . . ^ p . . - , . r , ,,,. h " a.-i-, •> f . - n t r a - t <~ \ a i m? - • r i e 
•; . ' w 7 ' • • e r s o n n * i Po 1 i c i e s r'\n - . . . . 
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employer may terminate the employee at will, for just 
cause or no cause, without fear of liability. Bruno v. 
Plateau Mining Co., 73 Utah Adv. Rep. 89 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987); Rose v. Allied Development Co., 719 P.2d 83 (Utah 
1986); Bihlmaier v. Carsen, 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979). 
Inasmuch as the employment was at will, the employer did 
not breach any contract and the trial court's summary 
dismissal was proper. 
The Bihlmaier case is dispositive of this issue. In 
that case the plaintiff, after extended negotiations, left 
a job in California and accepted employment in Utah to 
become the acting manager of a grocery store. The 
employer testified that plaintiff's employment was 
conditioned upon his activities during a trial period. 
Shortly after arriving in Utah the plaintiff tried to 
purchase a house. His loan application was refused when 
the employer stated on the application, "continued 
employment depends on applicant - hired on a trial basis 
only." Bihlmaier, 603 P.2d at 791. The plaintiff 
considered the employer's refusal to change this statement 
a constructive discharge and initiated a lawsuit for 
breach of the employment contract. The trial court 
granted the employer's motion for summary judgment and the 
plaintiff appealed. Id. 
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terminable ft* t he w i 1 I f either par
 2, c . • i if 
the acts of the employer did constitute a 
constructive discnarac of the plaintiff, the 
plaintiff has no r<qht >f actio- against the 
employer for that discharge. Therefore, * ^ 
defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law and the qraru >nu of the summary judgment 
moti"r ^ •> proper. Id a* " " 
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.vas at-w 
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B• The Utah Court of Appeals and Utah Supreme Court 
Have Firmly Rejected Any Departures From the Employment At 
Will Doctrine Based On An Employer's Policies. 
In two recent cases, Bruno v. Plateau Mining Co., 73 
Utah Adv. Rep. 89, and Rose v. Allied Development Co., 719 
P.2d 83, the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of 
Appeals reaffirmed the employment at-will doctrine as the 
law of this State. Gilmore asks this Court to disregard 
this law on the ground that S.L.C.A.P.fs Personnel 
Policies Manual is the employment contract. In the Bruno 
case the Utah Court of Appeals firmly rejected this 
argument in favor of the at-will doctrine. As a result, 
the dismissal of the breach of contract claims was proper 
and should be upheld. 
In the Bruno case the employer maintained a de 
facto personnel policy of imposing only temporary 
suspension as the maximum penalty for employee fighting. 
Bruno, nevertheless, was forced to resign for fighting in 
the mine. He filed a lawsuit against his employer for 
wrongful discharge. The undisputed evidence was that 
Bruno was hired as an employee at-will. Nevertheless, he 
claimed that the employer's de facto personnel policy 
created an implied employment contract which was breached 
by his termination. The lower court granted the employer's 
motion for summary judgment on the ground that Bruno's 
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still follows the general common law rule 
concerning personal employment contracts: (,n 
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y
 of a good consideration in addition to the 
services contracted to be rendered, 1 he contract 
is no more than an indefinite general hiri^-a 
which is terminable at the wi 1 i of either-
party.' (Citations omitted). An implied 
contract altering the employment at-will 
relationship, like other contracts 
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.*•!•"> that Plateau has a de facto personnel 
; of not terminating employees who fight ;i 
its mines, i '• >'s r: act ice alone is n< t enough to 
establish [iateau's intentional surrender of its 
right to terminate Bruno's emp'oyment at will. 
Id. 
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In this case, Gilmore is asking this Court to do 
exactly what it refused to do in the Bruno case - that is, 
depart from the employment at-will doctrine and recognize 
an implicit contractual right based upon an employer's 
unilateral promulgation of a policy manual. This Court 
has already rejected this major departure from Utah law 
which Gilmore urges based on the cases Toussaint v. Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 292 N.W.2d 880, and 
Forrester v. Parker, 606 P.2d 191 (N.M. 1980). 
In Toussaint, the Michigan Supreme Court stated: "We 
hold that employer statements of policy, such as the Blue 
Cross Supervisory Manual and Guidelines, can give rise to 
contractual rights in employees without evidence that the 
parties mutually agreed that the policy statements would 
create contractual rights in the employee, . . . M. 
(Emphasis added) Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 892. The Court 
of Appeals held in the Bruno case that this was not the 
law in Utah and that an implied contract, altering the 
at-will relationship, must be proven by acts or conduct 
manifesting the mutual assent of both parties. (Emphasis 
added). Bruno, 73 Utah Adv. Rep. at 90. 
In Forrester, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that 
a personnel policy guide controlled the employment 
relationship, holding: 
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p, ~/ide that an empl*:^je will not be dismissed 
except for cause enforceable i n the same manner 
as other contracts. It did not recognize 
^mnioyment as a fundamental right or create a 
"special " r i ght. The only right held in 
Toussaint to be enforceable was the right that 
arose out of the promise not to terminate except 
for cause. 
Employers and employees remail I fr ee to provide, 
or not to provide*, f or j ob secur i ty . Absent_a 
contractual provision for job security, either 
the employer or the employee may ordinarily 
terminate an employment contract at any time for 
any, or no, reason. [Emphasi s added.] 
Valentine v. General American Credit, Inc., 420 Mich. 256, 
258-59, 362 N.W. 2d 628 (1984) (footnote omitted). Thus 
even the Michigan Supreme Court has rejected Gilmore's 
argument that a personnel policy manual creates a new 
employment right or exception to the at-will doctrine. 
Moreover, the law in the majority of states which 
have considered this question is that the promulgation of 
a policy manual does not implicitly limit the right of an 
employer to terminate at-will. See, e.g. McConnell v. 
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 499 So.2d 68 (Fid. App. Ct. 
1986); Shaw v. S.S. Kresge, Co., 167 Ind. App. 1, 328 
N.E.2d 775 (1975); Heideck v. Kent General Hospital, Inc., 
446 A.2d 1095 (Del. 1982); Reid v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 
790 F.2d 453 (6th Cir. 1986); Johnson v. National Beef 
Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779 (1976); Schroeder 
v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 448 F.Supp. 910 (E.D. Mich. 1977). 
C. The Dismissal Was Also Proper Because Under 
Utah Law The Employer's Policies Do Not Constitute An 
Express Or Implied Contract As To The Duration Of 
Employment. 
In both the Bruno and Rose cases, the Courts have 
recognized only two limited exceptions to the employment 
at-will doctrine. These two exceptions are: 1) an 
express or implied stipulation as to the duration of the 
employment, or; 2) good consideration in addition to the 
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relation to the terms and conditions of his employment. 
Id. at 8-9 & 12-13. After obtaining a copy of the 
policies Gilmore was simply told that he was expected to 
follow them in his position as employee and supervisor. 
Id. at 17 & 20. He does not recall any other conversation 
relative to the policies. Icl. at 22. The Executive 
Director maintained a policy of advising new employees 
that the manual containing the policies existed, but he 
did not advise each one. Schultz Deposition at at 16. 
This evidence does not alter the fact that Gilmore was 
hired for an indefinite time. The parties did not 
expressly or implicitly stipulate that Gilmore was 
employed for any specific period of time. The trial Court 
correctly applied the law in dismissing the breach of 
contract claims. 
In further support of his argument Gilmore relies on 
two Utah cases, Moore v. Utah Technical College, 727 P.2d 
634 (Utah 1986), and Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State 
College, 636 P.2d 1063 (Utah 1981). He contends that 
these cases stand for the proposition that personnel 
policy manuals give rise to contractual rights and 
obligations. Actually, these cases fall within the first 
exception to the employment at-will doctrine. In each 
case, the plaintiffs were hired under a one year contract. 
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To satisfy the "good consideration" 
exception of Bihlmaier, plaintiff would have had 
to offer Allied, at its request, something more 
than what he was already obligated to do under 
his employment agreement, not just a 
continuation of the duties he was required to 
perform. 
Neither the statements made by Wetsel nor 
plaintiff's subjective understanding of those 
statements is adequate justification to find an 
implied contract or consideration sufficient to 
fall within the exceptions recognized by this 
Court. Rose, 719 P.2d at 86. 
In this case, Gilmore has not set forth any facts that 
support this exception to the employment at-will doctrine, 
nor has he advanced any argument in this regard. There 
simply is not any evidence in this case that can justify a 
finding of added consideration sufficient to fall within 
this exception. The personnel policies were always in 
effect during Gilmorefs employment. He simply continued 
to perform his duties during his employment. There is no 
evidence that either party offered any new consideration 
during his employment. Inasmuch as this exception has no 
application in this case, the summary judgment should be 
affirmed. 
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warning, 3) suspension, and 4) dismissal. The manual made 
clear that the purpose of this procedure was to prevent 
major acts of misconduct by giving early warning of the 
possible consequences for continued misconduct. The 
employer did not strictly comply with this procedure. 
Instead, Piacitelli was advised in numerous oral 
interviews of his unacceptable conduct, the specific 
deficiencies in his performance and that his job 
was in jeopardy. The Utah Supreme Court held: 
While exact conformance with the precise terms 
of the termination procedures is doubtless the 
least controversial course, so long as the 
substantial interests those procedures are 
designed to safeguard are in fact satisfied and 
protected, failure to conform to every technical 
detail of the termination procedure is not 
actionable. Piacitelli, 636 P.2d at 1067. 
As in the Piacitelli case, S.L.C.A.P.'s policy manual 
provides for progressive disciplinary steps, culminating 
in termination. It also provides for yearly written 
evaluations to be used, in part, for consideration in 
these disciplinary steps. Schultz Deposition at 9 & Ex. 
P-l. For instance, disciplinary action for incompetency 
or inefficiency should be evidenced by at least two 
consecutive performance evaluations. Ij3. The Manual does 
not contain any statement of this policy's purpose. 
However, such policies are generally designed to provide 
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of March, 1977, he was notified that he was going to be 
terminated. I_d. at 104. 
These undisputed facts show that the Executive 
Director met with Gilmore on numerous occasions about the 
problems with his work. Gilmore was well advised during 
his employment of the Executive Director's evaluation of 
his performance, even though the evaluations were not 
written. As in the Piacitelli case, the Executive 
Director notified Gilmore in these numerous oral 
interviews of his unacceptable conduct, the deficiencies 
in his performance, and that his job was in jeopardy. 
These notifications occurred long before his termination. 
As a result, the purposes for which the policy was 
established were satisfied. Gilmore was granted 
substantial early warning of his deficiencies and of the 
consequences thereof if the deficiencies persisted. 
Therefore, S.L.C.A.P.'s method in terminating Gilmore 
substantially complied with the policy manual. 
While Gilmore's job performance was deficient, this 
was not the primary reason for his termination. Gilmore 
was actually reduced in force. When it became apparent 
early in 1976 that Gilmore was having difficulty, federal 
officials also reported that S.L.C.A.P.'s accounting 
systems and procedures were cumbersome and outdated. 
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Schultz Deposition at 99-100. In May or June, 1976, the 
decision was made to computerize Gilmore's department, 
Gilmore Deposition at 86 & 89. However, Gilmore held no 
computer skills, ^d. at 28. Despite this drawback, on 
December 15, 1976, the Executive Director proposed a plan 
to the Board of Directors in which Gilmore would, 
nevertheless, remain as an Office Manager. The Board 
turned this plan down. Schultz Deposition at 128. As a 
result, the Executive Director completely reorganized 
Gilmore1s department by hiring an accounting supervisor 
with computer accounting background, directing a computer 
specialist to establish all of S.L.C.A.P.'s accounts on 
the computer and having the Executive Director assume all 
of the policy type functions of Gilmore1s position. Id. 
at 129-130. This eliminated Gilmore's position resulting 
in his reduction in force. Ld. The Executive Director 
believed that Gilmore needed unemployment compensation and 
needed to find other employment. Therefore, he cited only 
this primary reason, reduction in force, as the reason for 
termination. 16. at 131. 
The procedures and policies pertaining to a reduction 
in force are set forth at Chapter VII, Section B of the 
Manual as follows: 
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When it becomes necessary because of funding or 
budgetary limitations to terminate, reassign, 
transfer, or demote an employee, the Executive 
Director shall take such action based upon 
employee seniority, performance, skills, 
abilities and importance of position. All 
employees reassigned, terminated, transferred, 
or demoted shall be give fifteen (15) days of 
written notice, said notice specifying the 
reasons which dictated the actions of the 
Executive Director. 
Schultz Deposition at 9 & Ex. P-l. This policy only 
applies when funding or budgetary limitations necessitate 
termination. As shown in the preceding paragraph, Gilmore 
was reduced in force because the computerization of his 
department eliminated his position. The manual does not 
provide for any policies or procedures in this 
circumstance. Instead, the Executive Director has 
authority to reduce in force employees as deemed 
appropriate. R. at 151; Philbrick Deposition at 15. As a 
result, S.L.C.A.P. was not in violation of any specific 
policy or procedure for reducing Gilmore in force due to 
the elimination of his position. 
The manual does provide, however, that employees are 
entitled to fifteen days advance written notice of 
termination. Schultz Deposition at 9 & Ex. P-l. This 
procedure or policy is generally designed to provide the 
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employee an opportunity to begin securing new employment, 
thereby lessening the effects of unemployment. The first 
part of March, 1977, the Executive Director orally 
notified Gilmore that he was going to be terminated. 
Gilmore Deposition, at 104. On March 14, 1977, he was 
notified of his termination in writing. R. at 4 & 82. In 
the written notice, the Executive Director did not make 
the termination effective until four days later, March 18, 
1977. Gilmore then received two weeks pay in lieu of 
advance written notice, effective March 18. Gilmore 
Deposition at Ex. D-15. 
These undisputed facts establish that Gilmore was 
orally notified, about two weeks prior to the effective 
date, that he would be terminated. He was also given four 
days advance written notice. Then he was paid for two 
weeks beginning March 18, 1977, without having to report 
to work. This allowed Gilmore fifteen days of free time, 
with pay, to find new employment. If S.L.C.A.P. had 
strictly complied with the fifteen day advance written 
notice procedure Gilmore would not have enjoyed this free 
time with pay. As a result, the procedure S.L.C.A.P. used 
provided Gilmore with more opportunity to find new 
employment and lessen the effects of possible unemployment 
than the procedure in the policy manual. In other words, 
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the interests or reasons for this policy and procedure 
were certainly not compromised; rather, they were 
advanced. Hence, S.L.C.A.P., at the very least, 
substantially complied with the manual in this respect. 
The manual also provides that the notice of 
termination shall specify the reasons therefor, Schultz 
Deposition at 9 & Ex, P-l. As shown above, prior to 
termination Gilmore was well aware that his department was 
being computerized. He knew he held no computer skills. 
He was present at the meeting when the Executive Director 
proposed a plan to nevertheless retain Gilmore, which was 
turned down. He was handed his Separation Notice which 
cited the reason for termination as a reduction in force. 
R. at 4, 54 & 84. His written notice of termination 
explained that his position was eliminated. Gilmore 
Deposition at Vol. II, p. 9 & Ex. D-15. As is also shown 
above, the Executive Director met with Gilmore on numerous 
occasions regarding the problem with his work. Gilmore 
knew that his job was in jeopardy because of these 
problems. As a result, Gilmore was well advised and 
provided numerous notice of the reasons for terminating 
his employment. Hence, S.L.C.A.P. was in substantial 
compliance with this policy as well. 
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B. S.L.C.A.P. Complied With The Policy Manual In 
Hearing Gilmore's Appeal. 
S.L.C.A.P.fs appeal procedure was adopted to provide 
for prompt and fair consideration of personnel actions. 
Schultz Deposition at 9 & Ex. P-l. Gilmore complains that 
he was not afforded prompt and fair consideration. 
Specifically, he complains that he was not afforded a 
"formal hearing", was not given the right to confront or 
cross-examine the Executive Director, was never advised of 
the evidence presented against him, was not given the 
opportunity to rebut or respond to the evidence against 
him, and the literal or strict appeal procedures were 
violated. In other words, Gilmore believes that he was 
not afforded a fair hearing because it was not a trial 
type or formal hearing. However, due process, or 
fairness and justice, does not require a trial type 
hearing in every case. Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers 
v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 6 L.Ed. 2d 
1230 (1961). 
In Robinson v. Wichita Falls and North Texas 
Community Action Program, 507 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1975), an 
employee falsely accused another employee of 
misappropriating funds. The employee appealed the 
decision to terminate him. The grievance committee's 
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review was made on the basis of written statements, 
without personal appearance, formal presentations of 
evidence and argument, confrontation or cross examination, 
or any other formal or trial type characteristic. The 
United States Fifth Circuit Court held that a trial type 
hearing was not required. The rights afforded the 
employee by the fairness requirements of due process were 
satisfied by the Community Action's procedure. Also see 
Kelly v. Action for Boston Community Development, Inc., 
419 F.Supp. 511 (D. Mass. 1976), and Withrow v. Larkin, 
421 U.S. 35, 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed. 2d 712 (1975). 
The manner in which S.L.C.A.P. reviewed Gilmore's 
termination was substantially similar to the review 
afforded the employee in the Robinson v. Wichita Falls and 
North Texas Community Action Program case. The appeal 
procedure consists of two levels of review. The first 
level is to the Executive Director. Schultz Deposition at 
9 & Ex. P-l. He notified Gilmore the first part of March, 
1977, of the decision to terminate him. One to three days 
later Gilmore arranged a meeting with the Executive 
Director to prevail upon him to change his mind. GiJmore 
Deposition at 108. The meeting was held in the Executive 
Directors office. It lasted the better part of an hour. 
Id. at Vol. II, p. 16. Gilmore admits that in this 
-40-
meeting he was given every opportunity to demonstrate why 
he should not be terminated. I^d. at Vol. II, p. 6 & 17. 
He describes the meeting as a series of refutations 
between the Executive Director and himself. Jd. a t 
109-115. The Executive Director did not change his mind. 
The second level of review is to the Personnel 
Committee. Schultz Deposition at 9 & Ex. P-l. A hearing 
was scheduled for March 16, 1977. R. at 7. At the 
beginning of the meeting the Committee explained the 
hearing format to Gilmore. Gilmore was to make his 
statement before the Committee on a tape recorder. He 
would then be excused and the Executive Director would be 
called in to do the same. Gilmore Deposition at Vol. II, 
p. 29-31. The Committee also explained that there would 
not be sufficient time to conclude the hearing that day, 
so it would be continued to the next week. Td. Gilmore 
had no objection. Icl. The reason for this format was to 
afford Gilmore the right to speak his mind and present all 
the evidence he had outside of his immediate supervisor's, 
the Executive Director, presence. The Committee believed 
that this was more fair for Gilmore. Geter Deposition at 
29. The hearing was then conducted according to this 
format. Gilmore admits that the Committee did not refuse 
any of the evidence he offered. Gilmore Deposition at 
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Vol. II, p. 33. Both Gilmore and the Executive Director 
wrote statements to the Committee supporting their 
positions. 16. at 42-48. Gilmore was afforded the same 
rights as was S.L.C.A.P. Geter Deposition at 13. The 
Committee's chairman testified that the Committee was not 
biased against Gilmore but was fair in its hearing of 
Gilmorefs appeal. ]j3. T^e decision was based on the 
evidence presented. 3x1. at 27. 
Just as in the Robinson v. Wichita Falls and North 
Texas Community Action Program case, a formal hearing was 
not necessary to satisfy the requirements of due process. 
The procedures used at both appeal levels were fair and 
prompt. Gilmore was given notice of the hearing. He was 
afforded the right to be present and he presented all the 
evidence he desired. He was afforded the right to submit 
a written statement in addition to his testimony. His 
case was heard by three impartial members of the 
Committee. As a result, the purposes for which the appeal 
procedure was adopted were ful]y satisfied. 
Moreover, Gilmore never requested the formal 
procedures he now claims should have been provided. The 
Committee never refused to allow Gilmore to do something 
he requested to do. Gilmore Deposition at Vol. Ti, p. 33. 
He never objected to the format of the hearing. 16. at 
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Vol. II, p. 32. He never requested the Executive 
Director's presence. Id. at Vol. II, p. 29. He never 
requested that he be allowed to confront or cross-examine 
the Director at any time. Id. He never requested the 
right to challenge or disqualify any member of the 
Committee. R. at 575 & 581. He never requested that the 
Committee's decision be based solely on the evidence 
o 
adduced at the hearing. 1^ 3. He never requested a 
9 
written decision from the Committee. Ld. He never 
requested a verbatim record. _Id* A s a result, he 
waived these rights. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 
24, 13 L.Ed. 2d 630, 86 S.Ct. 783 (1965); Eliason v. 
Wilborn, 281 U.S. 457, 74 L.Ed. 962, 50 S.Ct. 382 (1930). 
Pierce v. Somerset R. Co., 171 U.S. 641, 43 L.Ed. 316, 19 
S.Ct. 64 (1898); Doty v. Love, 295 U.S. 64, 79 L. Ed. 
1303, 55 S. Ct. 558 (1935) . 
In addition, the procedures used in hearing Gilmore's 
appeal substantially complied with the personnel policies 
manual. The manual provides that the Executive Director 
provide employees a hearing within seven days of the 
notice of appeal. Schultz Deposition at 9 & Ex. P-l. The 
reasons for this type of procedure are to afford the 
employee an opportunity to change the decision, Lo give 
I Id-
9 Id. 
1 0 — • 
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his side of the story, to be fully informed of the reasons 
for termination, and allow the person or body hearing the 
appeal an opportunity to review the decision. Within four 
or five days after the Executive Director notified Gilmore 
of the decision to terminate him, he was afforded a full 
hearing. Gilmore was granted every opportunity at this 
hearing to change the Executive Director's mind. The 
Executive Director heard all of the evidence, reviewed it 
and upheld his decision. As a result, this appeal policy 
was fully satisfied. 
The manual then provides that an appeal may be taken 
to the personnel committee. Jd. The Committee is 
responsible to provide a hearing within seven days of the 
notice of appeal. I_d. Within five days after concluding 
the hearing the Committee is then responsible to prepare 
and submit its findings. I^d* T h e reason for this type 
of procedure is to insure that the procedures below were 
administered fairly and not arbitrarily, capriciously or 
discriminatively. Gilmore was afforded his hearing before 
the Personnel Committee within seven days after notice of 
his appeal. It was held on March 16, 1977, and finished 
on March 21, 1977. The Committee consists of thrpe 
members and it was heard by all three. R. at 7, 56, 150 & 
156. Gilmore had every opportunity to present all his 
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evidence and argument. Gilmore Deposition at 158. On 
April 1, 1971, the Personnel Committee Chairman advised 
Gilmore that the Committee was not able to make 
arrangements to meet for the final decision. R. at 8. 
The Chairman also told him that the reason they could not 
reach the decision within five days was due to the many 
pieces of evidence and the legal ramifications. Gilmore 
Deposition at 166. Gilmore did not object, nor did he 
insist that the Committee render the decision in five days 
despite this notification. _Id. at 166-167. On April 
13,1977, the Committee rendered its finding supporting the 
Executive Director's decision to terminate Gilmore. Id. 
at 5-6 & Ex. D-14. Again, this procedure substantially 
complied with the manual. Gilmore was afforded a prompt, 
fair hearing and the policies of review were fully 
satisfied. 
POINT III SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING GILMORE1S CLAIMS 
AGAINST THE EMPLOYEES AND OFFICERS OF 
S.L.C.A.P. IS PROPER BECAUSE THESE INDIVIDUAL 
DEFENDANTS ARE NOT PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR ANY 
PURPORTED BREACH OF CONTRACT. 
The well established rule of law is that individual 
employees and officers of a corporation, who act within 
the course and scope of their employment, act under a 
privilege and cannot be held individually liable for the 
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corporation's breach of contract. Wise v. Southern 
Pacific Co., 223 Cal. App. 2d 50, 35 Cal. Rptr. 659 
(1953), afffd on other grounds, 1 Cal. 3d 600, 83 Cal. 
Rptr. 202 (1970). Also see Golden v. Anderson, 256 Cal. 
App. 2d 714, 64 Cal. Rptr. 404 (1967). 
In the Wise case the plaintiff sued his former 
employer for wrongful discharge and also sued his former 
co-employees for conspiracy to obtain his discharge. The 
Court of Appeal upheld demurrers to the complaint as to 
the individual defendants and stated: 
Agents and employees of a corporation cannot 
conspire with their corporate principal or 
employer where they act in their official 
capacities on behalf of the corporation and not 
as individuals for their individual advantage. 
[Citations omitted.] This rule derives from the 
principle that ordinarily corporate agents and 
employees acting for and on behalf of the 
corporation cannot be held liable for inducing a 
breach of the corporation's contract since being 
in a confidential relationship to the 
corporation their action in this respect is 
privileged. The inducement of the breach to be 
actionable must be both wrongful and 
unprivileged. (Citations omitted; emphasis 
added.) Wise, 223 Cal App. 2d at 72-73. 
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In Gilmore's claim for breach of contract he has not 
made any allegation that the employees and officers, 
individually named in this suit, acted beyond the scope of 
their employment. The undisputed facts show clearly that 
these individuals acted only in the course of their 
employment, for and on behalf of S.L.C.A.P. Therefore, 
their actions were privileged and they cannot be held 
personally liable for any purported breach of the 
employment contract. Because Gilmore has not alleged that 
these individual defendants acted other than in the course 
and scope of their employment, nor set forth any facts 
showing otherwise, the trial Court's summary dismissal of 
his breach of contract claims against the individual 
defendants is proper. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents seek the following relief: 
1. An affirmance of the lower Court's summary 
judgment dismissing Gilmore's breach of contract claims 
against all Respondents, with prejudice, and an award of 
Respondent's costs pursuant to Rule 34, R. Utah Ct. App. 
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2. In the alternative, affirmance of the lower 
Court's summary judgment dismissing the breach of contract 
claims against the Respondents Hal J. Schultz, Robert E. 
Philbrick, Fred Geter, Richard Fields and Ann O'Connell, 
and an award of their costs, pursuant to Rule 34, R. Utah 
Ct. App. 
DATED t h i s £<^ day of fisJ(MJLL6LM 1988 . 
u 6Ls 
JOUU/K. RICE 
Attorney for Respondents 
STEPHEN W. COOK 
Attorney for Respondents 
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Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that on the ^ ^ day of February, 
1988, I mailed, postage prepaid, four copies of the Brief 
of Respondents together with a copy of this Certificate of 
Service to the following: 
Nann Novinski-Durando and 
Mark S. Miner 
4348 South Jupiter Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124 
JOFWK. RICE 
At torney for Defendants/Respondents 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
oooOooo 
WALTER K. GILMORE, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DEFENDANTS' FIRST REQUESTS 
FOR ADMISSIONS 
Civil No. ^ -7f-0^^r 
SALT LAKE AREA COMMUNITY 
ACTION PROGRAM, a Utah cor-
poration; HAL J. SCHULTZ, 
Executive Director; ROBERT E. 
PHILBRICK, Presxdent, Board 
of Trustees; FRED GETER, 
Chairman, Personnel Committee; 
ANN OlCONNELL, TERRY WILLIAMS, 
JOHN E, DELANEY, TED L. 
WILSON, JENNINGS PHILLIPS, 
GLEN GREENER, PETE KUTULAS, 
WILLIAM DUNN, RALPH McCLURE, 
JESS AGRAZ, DON MIERVA, LUCY 
OTERO, GLEN M. LARSEN, BERNICE 
BENNS, LAMBERTUS JENSEN, 
SOLOMON CHACON, LEON REESE, 
PALMER DEPAULIS, RICHARD LIGH, 
VICTOR DELGADO, NORBEST 
MARTINEZ, MAVIS LINDSAY, 
M. C. EBERHARDT, CLEMENT JAY, 
EV/ MAEZ, JERRI BROWN, WAYNE 
HORROCKS, MERNOINE JEX, ROBERT 
MACRI, constituting the Board 
of Trustees of the Salt Lake 
Area Community Action Program, 
their officers, employees, 
successors and assigns, 
Defendants. 
oooOooo 
The Defendants by and through their undersigned counsLi 
Stephen V. Cook, pursuant to Rules 36 and 37(c) of the Tederal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, herewith serve upon the Plaintiff tht 
following requests for admissions for response within thirty (30; 
days. Each request shall be deemed by the Defendants as admitted 
unless, within th^t-v (30) davs after service of the requests, the 
Plaintiff serves upon the Defendants a written answer or an appr 
priate objectioa addressed to the request signed by the Plainlifl 
or his attorney. 'The defendants provide notice of their intent • 
Addendum 1 
pursue reasonable expenses including attorney's fees in provii. 
any request inappropriately denied. All requests are directed 
to the period of April 1, 1976 to April 1, 1977. 
-REQUEST NO. 1: The Salt Lake Community Action Program has no power to 
impose governmental sanctions, either civil or criminal in nature, 
upon any citizen of the State of Utah or any subdivision thereof. 
REQUEST NO. 2: The Salt Lake Area Community Action Prograiv 
has no power to impose governmental sanctions, either civil or 
criminal in nature, "upon any citizen of the United States of Amc: -
ica or any subdivision thereof. 
REQUEST NO. 3: The Salt Lake Area Community Action Program 
has nb power to impose taxes, levy fines or assessments, or other 
governmental fees upon the citizens of the State of Utah and its 
subdivisions' or upon the citizens of the United States and its 
subdivisions. 
REQUEST NO. A: The Salt Lake Area Community Action Program 
does not enjoy free mailing privileges or has postage paid by th/ 
Utah State or United States Government. 
REQUEST NO. 5: The Salt Lake Area Community Action Program 
has no vested regulatory authority to regulate the conduct or 
affairs of non-employee citizens of the State of Utah or any of 
its political subdivisions. 
REQUEST NO. 6: The Salt Lake Area Community Action Progra.. 
has no vested regulatory authority to regulate the conduct cu 
affairs*of non-employee citizens of the United States or a^ y 
its political subdivisions. 
REQUEST NO. 7: None \f f.he Defendants are agencres crc i? -' 
mentalities of the State of Utah or its political subdi"., , f>-: 
che Dele~>dr.its arc ;•.£•:•:•::\; .M-> •• 
:. ; p'. * *:"'.
 :..'. -ul L ivi ?:. :>:~ s . 
f d n e r r \ o '••-... . • *•-. •-. •• ••. ' .."? 
REQUEST NO. 8: Xonr 
S u i t e d Stat*. • ;:V'H: 
Addendum 2 
REQUEST NO. 10: The Salt Lake Area Community Action Pro-
gram has no power or right to publish rules and regulations in 
the Federal Register. 
REQUEST NO. 11: The Salt Lake Area Community Action Program 
has no power or right to publish rules and regulations in the 
State of Utah Bulletin published by the Department of Finance, Utah 
State Archives & Records Service. 
REQUEST NO 12: The Salt Lake Area Community Action Program 
has no power or right to the use of equipment, facilities, or 
supplies provided by the General Services Administration. 
REQUEST NO. 13: The Salt Lake Area Community Action Program 
has np power or right to the use of equipment, facilities, or 
supplies owned by the State of Utah or any of its political sub-
divisions . 
REQUEST NO. 14: The Salt Lake Area Community Action Program 
does not have any powers of condemnation. 
REQUEST NO. 15: The Salt Lake Area Community Action Prograi 
has no authority to deposit and withdraw money from the monetary 
depositories of the Utah State or Federal Governments. 
REQUEST NO. 16: The Salt Lake Area Community Action Program 
employees are not employed and subject to any municipal, county 
or state merit systems'. 
REQUEST NO. 17: The employees of the Salt Lake Area Commun;t\ 
Action Program are not employees of, nor paid by, the State of Ui.» 
or its political subdivisions. 
REQUEST NO. 18: The Community Services Administration does 
not operate as a federal agency on a local level and does not 
supervise the daily operation of a community action agency. 
REQUEST 'NO. 19: * The State of Utah and its political sub-
divisions have • , .t or power over the daily personnel decis-
ions-p£ the Salt Lake Area Community Action Program. 
REQUEST NO. 20: The State of Utah and its political sub-
divisions does not supervise or participate in the daily personnLI 
decisions of the Salt Lake Area Community Action Program. 
Addendum 3 
REQUEST NO. 21: There are no rules or regulations of the 
Community Services Administration that authorizes the CommuniLy 
Services Administration to supervise or participate in the daily 
personnel decisions of the Salt Lake Area Community Action Prograr 
REQUEST NO. 22: The Community Services Administration has 
neither interpreted nor defined the phrase "fair consideration" 
in CSA instruction 6900-01(c)5. 
REQUEST NO. 23: The relationship of the Community Services 
Administration to the Salt Lake Area Community Action Program 
is in the nature of a grantor-grantee/contractor-contractee 
relationship. 
REQUEST NO. 24: The Community Services Administration has 
no authority to require the Salt Lake Area Community Action Program 
to hire or fire particular employees or take other specific per-
sonnel actions. 
REQUEST NO. 25: The Salt Lake Area Community Action Progran 
l 
is a private non profit corporation organized under Section 16-6-lC 
et. seq. U.C.A. (1953), as amended, entitled "Utah Nonprofit 
Corporation and Cooperative Association Act". 
REQUEST NO. 26: Prior to the Plaintiff's termination of em-
ployment and the completion of all grievance procedures provided 
by the Defendants' personnel policies, the Plaintiff never re-
quested information relating to hearing procedures and format, in-
cluding rules governing the admissibility of evidence. 
REQUEST NO. 27: Prior to the Plaintiff's termination of em-
ployment and the completion of all grievance procedures provided 
by the Defendants' personnel policies, the Plaintiff never re-
quested to be represented by counsel or by an appropriate counsel 
substitute. 
REQUEST NO , Prior to the Plaintiff's termination of em-
piloymeti^  -and the completion of all grievance procedures provided 
by the Defendants.1 personnel policies, the Plaintiff never requeM 
to confront or cross-examine witnesses or accusors. 
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REQUEST NO. 29: Prior to the Plaintiff's termination of en 
ployment and the completion of all grievance procedures provideu 
by the Defendants' personnel policies, the Plaintiff never requester 
any right to challenge and disqualify members of the hearing bod> 
nor did he challenge or attempt to disqualify members of the 
hearing body. 
REQUEST NO. 30: Prior to the Plaintiff's termination of em-
ployment and the completion of all grievance procedures provided 
by the Defendants' personnel policies, the Plaintiff never requests 
any right to have the decision of the hearing body based solely 
upon evidence adduced at the hearing. 
REQUEST NO. 31: Prior to the Plaintiff's termination of em-
ployment and the completion of all grievance procedures provided 
by the Defendants' personnel policies, the Plaintiff never requestc 
the right to have a written decision of the hearing body stating 
the reasons for their decision and the evidence adduced at the 
hearing upon which the decision was based. 
REQUEST NO. 32: Prior to the Plaintiff's termination of em-
ployment and the completion of all grievance procedures provided 
by the Defendants; personnel policies, the Plaintiff never request" 
the right to have a verbatim record of the hearing made and ex-
hibits retained. 
REQUEST NO. 33: The Plaintiff had no individual written em-
ployment contract that specified any definite period of time for 
employment with the Defendants. 
REQUEST NO. 34: The Plaintiff was terminated for cause froi.» 
the Assistance Payments Division on April 14, 1979. 
REQUEST NO. 35: During 1977, 1978, and 1979, there were jol^ 
m bookkeeping, accounting, and accounting collection with pnvi c 
employers in tin i paying between $500.00 and $700.00 a month, 
I 
that tt^ e Plaintiff-could have obtained had he applied. 
REQUEST NO. 36: No employer has refused to employ the Plain-
tiff because of the Plaintiff's prior employment service with 
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Addendum 5 
the Defendants. 
REQUEST NO. 37: The Defendants' sole stated reason for the 
Plaintiff's termination of employment was "Reduction in Force." 
• REQUEST NO. 38: At the time of the Plaintiff's termination 
of employment, the fiscal department of the Defendants was reor-
ganized: by, inter alia, the position of Fiscal Director was ab-
olished; the assumption of the Fiscal Director's responsibilities 
by the Executive Director, Hal J. Schultz; and the hiring of an 
accounting supervisor, Gary Pararra, who had training in computor 
programming and accounting. 
REQUEST NO. 39: For the fiscal year ending September 30, 
1977, the State of Utah and its political subdivisions never ap* 
propr^ated funds (as opposed to donations and specific contracts) 
for the administration of the Salt Lake Area Community Action Pro-
gram. 
REQUEST NO. 40: For the fiscal year ending September 30, 
1977, tlje percentage of total income received by the Salt Lake Are.1 
Community Action Program from the State of Utah and its political 
subdivisions for specific contracts was 7.27o ($145,000.00 divided 
by $2,026,000.00). 
REQUEST NO. 41: For the fiscal year ending September 30, 
1977, the percentage of total income received by the Salt Lake 
Area Community Action Program from the State of Utah and its pol-
itical subdivisions for donations was 3.57o ($70,068.00 divided 
by $2,026,000.00). 
REQUEST NO. 42: For the fiscal year ending September 30, 
1977, all income received by the Salt Lake Area Community Action 
Program from the Federal Government was for specific contracts 
or grants with the Federal Government. 
REQUEST NO. 43: * The Plaintiff was afforded the right to 
submit; a griev.t .aer Chapter IX, Section A, of the Defendants' 
i 
Perponnjel- Policies'and the Plaintiff did so submit a grievance. 
REQUEST NO. 44; The Plaintiff was afforded the right to 
have his grievance referred to the Personnel Administration undui 
Chapter IX, Section A, of the Defendants' Personnel Policies. 
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REQUEST HO. 45: The Plaintiff was afforded the right to re-, 
his grievance to the Executive Director under Chapter IX, Sectiou 
A, of the Defendants' Personnel Policies and the Plaintiff did so 
by letter dated March 15, 1977. 
REQUEST NO. 46: The Plaintiff was afforded the right to ap-
peal his grievance to the Executive Director under Chapter IX, 
Section B, of the Defendants' Personnel Policies and he did so 
appeal to the Executive Director by letter dated March 15, 197 7. 
REQUEST NO. 47: The Executive Director considered the-Plain-
tiff's referral/appeal and notified the Plaintiff by letter dated 
March 16, 1977, of such consideration. 
REQUEST NO. 48: The Plaintiff was afforded the right to appea 
his grievance to the Personnel Committee of the Board of Trustee^ 
under Chapter IX, Section B, of the Defendants' Personnel Policies 
and he did so appeal to the Personnel Committee of the Board of 
Trustees. 
I 
REQUEST NO. 49: The Plaintiff was afforded a hearing within 
seven (7) days from his notice of appeal to the Personnel CommitIII 
under Chapter IX, Section B, of the Defendants' Personnel Policies 
REQUEST NO. 50: The Plaintiff was provided the right and 
opportunity to present any witnesses or evidence he desired in 
his behalf under Chapter IX, Section B, of the Defendants' Person-
nel Policies. 
REQUEST NO. 51: Within five (5) days of the hearing of the 
Eersonnal Committee, the Personnel Committee notified the Plaintifi 
in writing that they required more time to deliberate and the Plc'^ i 
tiff did not object to this procedure. 
REQUEST NO. 52: On April 13, 1977, the Plaintiff was notif-
ied in writing by the' Personnel Committee of its findings under 
Chapter IX, Sett.
 f i>, of the Defendants' Personnel Policies. 
• r 
jBEQUEST NO. 53: The Plaintiff was afforded all grievence 
and appeal rights.and opportunities set forth in Chapter IX of 
-7-
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the Defendants' Personnel Policies. 
REQUEST MO. 54: The Plaintiff received pay for two weeks 
fie did not work following his termination of employment from the 
Defendants. 
REQUEST NO. 55: The Plaintiff was not terminated because of 
any exercise of his constitutional rights. 
REQUEST NO. 56: Prior to the Plaintiff's termination of em-
ployment and the completion of all grievance procedures provided 
by the Defendants' Personnel Policies, the Plaintiff never com-
plained about (A) the hearing procedures and format, including 
the rules governing the admissibility of evidence; (B) not having 
counsel or an appropriate counsel substitute; (C) any lack of 
confrontation or cross-examination of witnesses or accusors; (D) 
the composition of the hearing body; (E) the decision of the Per-
sonnel Committee being based upon the evidence adduced at the 
hearing; and (F) not having a verbatim record of the hearing made 
and exhibits retained. 
REQUEST NO. 57: Prior to the Plaintiff's termination of em-
ployment, the Salt Lake Area Community Action Program received no 
income or training and technical advice from the Utah State Ec-
onomic Opportunity Office. 
REQUEST NO. 58: There are no procedures or practices whereb) 
an employee has a right of appeal from personnel decisions of the 
Salt Lake Area Community Action Program to the State of Utah or i' 
political subdivisions or to the federal government. 
REQUEST. NO. 59: The Plaintiff's grievance was provided pro:, 
consideration by the Defendants. 
• REQUEST NO. 60: The Personnel Committee, individually and 
collectively, was not* biased or prejudiced against the Plaintiff. 
'IfrEQUEST NO.
 t The Utah State Economic Opportunity Office 
s .an .organization'-separate and distinct from the Salt Lake Area 
Community Action and has no regulatory authority over the Salt 
-8-
Addendum 8 
h 
Lake Area Community Action Program. 
DATED this %Q day of February, 1980. 
•J <2u 
STEPHEN W. COOK 
Attorney for'Defendants 
L1TTLEFIELD, COOK 6c PETERSON 
426 South Fifth East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Defendants1 First Requests 
for Admissions, to Kathryn Collard, Attorney at Law, Newhouse Build-
ing, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this day of February, 1$80, 
postage prepaid. 
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KATHRYN COLLARD 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
COLLARD, KUHNHAUSEN, PIXTON & DOWNES 
Ten Exchange Place, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 534-1663 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
WALTER K. GILMORE, 
Plaintiff, 
-v-
SALT LAKE AREA COMMUNITY 
ACTION PROGRAM, et al., 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF"S ANSWERS TO 
DEFENDANT'S FIRST REQUEST 
FOR ADMISSIONS 
Civil No. C-78-0258 
Plaintiff, WALTER K. GILMORE, by and through his 
attorney, KATHRYN COLLARD, hereby submits his Answers to 
Defendant's First Request for Admissions, in accordance 
with the provisions of Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
Admit. 
Admit. 
Request No. 1: 
Request No %: 
Request No. 3j^ Admit. 
Request No. ;i; Admit. 
Request No. 5: Deny. 
Request No. 6: Deny. 
Request No. 7: Deny. 
Request No. 8: Deny. 
Request No. 9: Admit. 
Request No. 10? Admit. 
Request No._ 113 Admit. 
Request No. 12: Deny. 
Request No. 13: Deny. 
Request No.,l4< Admit. 
Request No. 15: Deny. 
Request No.
 v16; Admit. 
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Request No. 17: Deny. 
Request No. 18: Deny. 
Request No. 19: Deny. 
Request No. 20: Deny. 
Request No. 21: Deny. 
Request No'. 22: Deny. 
Request No. 23; Admit. 
Request No. 24: Deny. 
Request No.. 25 \ Admit. 
Request No. 26: Deny, 
Request No. 27: Deny. 
Request No. 28: Deny. 
Request Ko._ (Z9 > k&iftit. 
Request No. 30 Admit. 
Request NO. jl' Admit. 
Request No. 32: Admit. 
Request No. .33; Admit. 
Request No. 34: Deny. 
Request No. 35: Plaintiff objects to this request 
for admission upon the ground that it requires Plaintiff to 
speculate about facts and occurrences about which he has 
no personal knowledge. 
Request No. 36: Plaintiff has no information 
upon which to admit or deny this request for admission and 
accordingly denies the same. 
Request No. 37: Deny. 
Request No. 38: Deny. 
Request No. 39: Deny. 
Request No. 40: Deny. 
Request No. 41: Deny. 
Request No. 4 2» Admit. 
Request No. 43: Plaintiff admits that he filed 
a grievance but denies that the grievance was filed pursuant 
to Section A of Chapter IX of the Defendants1 Personnel 
Addendum 11 
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Policies. 
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Request 
Request 
Request 
Request 
Request 
No. 
No. 
No. 
No. 
NQ. 
44: 
45: 
46: 
47: 
48: 
Request 
Request 
Request 
Request 
No. 
No. 
No. 
No. 
50: 
51: 
52: 
53: 
Deny. 
Deny. 
Deny. 
Deny. 
Deny, 
Request No.
 i 4 9 ? Admit. 
Deny. 
Deny. 
Deny. 
Deny. 
Request No. 54/ Admit. 
Request No. 55; Admit 
Request No. 56: Deny. 
Request No. 57: Deny. 
Request No. 58: Deny. 
Request No. 59: Deny. 
Request No. 60: Deny. 
Request No..61: Admit. 
DATED this 2./ day of March, 1980, 
?/fc^ '"&£__-« 
WALTER K. GILMORE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
WALTER K. GILMORE, being first duly sworn upon 
his oath, deposes and states that he is the Plaintiff in 
the above referenced action; that he has read the foregoing 
Answers to Defendant's First Request for Admission; that 
the answers thereto are true and correct to the best of 
his knowledge, information and belief. 
DATED this 'ZJ day of March, 1980. 
~?/<SSr.S< ^4; ;>>-#-/<* 
WALTER K. GILMORE 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this ±1 / day 
of March, 1980. 
. )».Y COV.V.I:$»O:J trp;nts c c ::> 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this 20th day of March, 
1980, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Plain-
tiff vs Answers To Defendants First Request For Admissions, to 
Stephen W, Cookf Attorney for Defendants, to his office at 
426 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, UtahJ 84102, by depositing 
the same in the U,S, Mail, postage prepaid. 
SlOwl M/A^^t 
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